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Updates from the International
and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals
International Criminal Court
Maximizing the Impact of ICC
Preliminary Examinations
The primary goal of the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) preliminary examinations is to determine whether there are
grounds to launch an official ICC investigation into a situation. As a basis for the
decision to open an investigation, preliminary examinations have the potential to
further the Court’s overall goals of ending impunity and deterring future crimes.
To successfully achieve these goals, preliminary examinations require a balanced
approach. On one hand, the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) must adopt a consistent
method of analysis that provides sufficient
information about the investigation to spur
national proceedings and alert potential
perpetrators of crimes that they could be
held accountable. On the other hand, the
OTP must adapt to a wide variety of circumstances and cannot provide information that would raise expectations about
the Court’s involvement, compromise due
process, or risk the safety of victims and
witnesses. During the first decade of the
Court’s work, inconsistency among the
approaches to preliminary examinations,
especially the absence of clear timelines,
has limited their effectiveness.
The ICC initiates preliminary examinations in one of three ways: through a decision of the Prosecutor; through a referral
from a State Party or the UN Security
Council; or through a declaration of a nonState Party pursuant to Article 12(3) of
the Rome Statute, under which that State
accepts ICC jurisdiction for the preliminary examination and consequent proceedings. In all three situations, the Prosecutor
follows the same procedure to determine
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation based on three
criteria laid out in Article 53(1) of the
Rome Statute. The Prosecutor must first
determine whether there is temporal, material, and either territorial or personal jurisdiction. Second, the Prosecutor considers
whether the case would be admissible,
taking into consideration both the gravity
of the alleged crimes and whether there

are already sufficient and ongoing national
proceedings. Finally, the Prosecutor considers whether ICC proceedings would
violate the interests of justice.
In practice, however, the timeline of
preliminary examinations conducted by the
Prosecutor to date has been inconsistent.
Without a clear and predetermined timeline, the Prosecutor has progressed quickly
through all three Article 53(1) steps in
some situations, while drawing out his
analysis in others. In part, these discrepancies are necessary because the time required
to analyze Article 53(1) factors varies based
on the circumstances. In evaluating admissibility, the Prosecutor must determine
whether there are already national proceedings covering the same crimes and
individuals that would likely be the focus
of an ICC investigation. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the
Prosecutor quickly found that no national
proceedings were ongoing and moved to
the next phase of his analysis. However, the
preliminary examination in Colombia continues because some national proceedings
are ongoing. Therefore, the Prosecutor must
evaluate whether the national proceedings
are genuine and focused on the individuals
most responsible before moving to the next
phase in his analysis.
Although certain situations require
more time to complete all of the Article
53(1) steps, as preliminary examinations
in Colombia and other situations are drawn
out without even a general timeline, they
become less credible. When the Prosecutor
quickly decides to open an investigation
— as in the Kenya situation — without
making a decision about long-term preliminary examinations — in places like
Colombia and Afghanistan — it can give
rise to the impression that the Prosecutor
has been influenced by non-legal factors.
Disparate timelines may lead to impressions that the Prosecutor allocates time
and resources unevenly among preliminary
examinations, and could be mitigated by
increasing transparency and establishing
general timelines.
As preliminary examinations continue
without a decision, potential perpetrators
49

and national authorities may doubt the
seriousness of the OTP’s investigations. As
the prospect of an ICC investigation fades,
there are fewer incentives to comply with
the ICC’s laws. In this way, prolonged preliminary examinations weaken the Court’s
ability to deter crimes and encourage
national proceedings. The lack of even a
general timeline is difficult for victims and
affected communities, who have no indication of how long they must wait for justice,
or if justice will even come at all.
Preliminary examinations provide a
potential avenue for the Court to have
a greater impact outside the courtroom.
The OTP has taken some positive steps
by increasing transparency, but the inconsistent approach to preliminary examinations has weakened their credibility and
effectiveness in spurring national proceedings and deterring crimes. By establishing
clear guidelines, a general timeline, and
consistently providing updates regarding
preliminary examinations, the OTP could
help the ICC achieve its goals of deterring
crimes and ending impunity without even
going to trial.

New Mechanisms Established
to Facilitate Merit-Based ICC
Elections
At the Tenth Session of the Assembly
of States Parties (ASP) from December
12 to 21, 2011, States Parties to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) voted
in elections resulting in the largest change
in leadership since the ICC’s first elections
in 2003. The nominations and elections of
the Chief Prosecutor and six new judges
were significant because two new committees were established to evaluate the
qualifications of the candidates for those
posts. Such committees have not been used
in past elections, and they represent an
important step toward a more transparent
and merit-based election process.
At the Ninth Session of the ASP in 2010,
the ASP established a Search Committee
to facilitate the nomination and election
of the next Chief Prosecutor with the goal
of electing a candidate by consensus. The
Search Committee received expressions of
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interest or recommendations to consider 52
candidates. After reviewing their credentials, the Search Committee interviewed
eight of the candidates and recommended
four to the ASP. Following informal consultations among States Parties, Fatou
Bensouda was selected as the consensus
candidate on December 1, 2011, and was
formally elected on December 12, 2011.
Her nine-year term as Chief Prosecutor
will begin in June 2012.
The creation of the Search Committee
was praised for facilitating nominations
based on merit. Merit-based nominations
and elections are important to maintain the
credibility and impartiality of the Court.
The method of informally submitting
nominations to a committee also helps
to avoid practices such as vote trading,
which threatens the credibility of both
the Prosecutor and the Court. However,
some criticized the Search Committee for
a lack of transparency and access to information. The Search Committee was also
criticized for lack of diversity because only
five states were represented — one for
each regional group — and there were no
requirements for gender diversity.
Nominations for judicial candidates
also received impartial review intended
to encourage a merit-based process. The
Coalition for the International Criminal
Court (CICC) created an Independent
Panel composed of experts in international
law and criminal law to raise awareness
about the nomination criteria and review
the qualifications of judicial candidates.
Unlike the ASP Search Committee for the
Prosecutor, the Independent Panel did not
endorse or oppose candidates, but rather
evaluated their qualifications to determine whether they met the criteria for
judges laid out in Article 36 of the Rome
Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC.
Article 36 specifies requirements related
to candidates’ moral character, past experience, and competence in relevant areas
of law. Though the ASP has the authority
to establish an Advisory Committee on
judicial nominations under Article 36(4)
(c), it has never exercised this authority
and, as such, the Independent Panel is not
affiliated with the ASP. In its final report,
the Independent Panel found that four of
the nineteen judicial candidates were not
qualified because they lacked either the
experience or competence in a certain area
of law required under Article 36. After fifteen rounds of voting from December 12 to

16, States Parties elected six new judges,
all of whom the Independent Panel found
to be qualified.
The Independent Panel received similar
praise as the ASP Search Committee for its
role in supporting a merit-based process,
but faced different challenges and criticisms. One concern was whether and how
the members of the Independent Panel
would measure the qualifications of the
candidates. Some requirements under the
Rome Statute, such as that the candidate
possess high moral character, are difficult
to measure, and there were concerns about
the panel’s ability to accurately assess such
intangible qualities. Nevertheless, many
found the panel members’ extensive experience in international law and criminal
law as well as their geographic diversity
and knowledge of different legal systems
sufficient to provide expertise to evaluate
the criteria for judicial candidates.
As a judicial body, the independence
and impartiality of the ICC are essential
to its ability to deliver justice for grave
violations of human rights. Electing court
officials through a merit-based process
safeguards the independence of the Court
by alleviating perceptions of political
influence that can arise from vote trading. Therefore, fair and merit-based elections serve the Court in two ways: first,
the Court benefits from the leadership of
the most highly-qualified candidates; and
second, the Court earns respect and confidence for representatives elected through
a transparent and merit-based process.
The Court will reap these benefits as the
mechanisms established to review the judicial and prosecutorial candidates for this
election are refined in the future.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers the International
Criminal Court for the Human Rights
Brief.

Ad Hoc Tribunals
Limiting the Exposure of
Protected Witnesses in ICTY
Proceedings
On October 31, 2011, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) sentenced Serbian Radical Party
leader Vojislav Seselj to eighteen months
incarceration for contempt of court, under
50

Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules of Evidence
and Procedure (Rules), for Seselj’s willful
disclosure of protected witness information
on his website. In the second of three such
contempt proceedings related to Seselj’s
release of protected information, the Trial
Chamber found that Seselj directly and
intentionally violated its protective orders.
This case presents a unique challenge for
witness protection at the ICTY. Rule 69(C)
of the Rules requires that a testifying witness’ identity be revealed to the defense
prior to trial as a basic tenant of the Article
21(4)(e) right to cross-examine. Yet when
an accused individual ignores the ICTY’s
protective orders and reveals a witness’
identity, other witnesses may be reluctant to
testify. In a case like Seselj, where fears of
witness intimidation stalled the proceedings
for over a year in 2010, Rule 69(C) could
potentially endanger a witness. The Trial
Chamber noted that “public confidence in
the effectiveness of its orders and decisions is
absolutely vital to the success of the work of
the Tribunal,” and it must ensure that future
witness protection measures will effectively
prevent such disclosures, as required by
Article 20 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
According to Rule 75(B)(i), the
Chamber may proprio motu institute
witness protection measures to include
expunging identifying information from
public records, allowing testimony via
image or voice altering devices, or assigning a pseudonym. Further, Rule 69 authorizes protective orders for all information used in the proceedings. In Seselj’s
case, the Chamber issued protective orders
and pseudonyms for many witnesses, and
issued a general order to Seselj to refrain
from disclosing such information. Seselj
violated the orders of the Trial Chamber
when he released identifying information
and reprinted portions of statements made
by witnesses in confidential submissions,
which later appeared on his website and
in a book that sold 10,000 copies. Seselj,
representing himself, contended that the
witnesses gave him permission to disclose,
that exposing information about the reliability of the witnesses was necessary for
his defense, and that these witnesses did
not need protective measures.
The Amicus Prosecutor who brought
the contempt charges also noted that
Seselj seemed to enjoy the possibility
that he would be charged with contempt,
thereby bringing attention to his stated
goals of derailing the proceedings and
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delegitimizing the ICTY. Because of the
willful nature of Seselj’s disclosures and
Seselj’s stated intent to “create conditions
for the next [disclosure]” when the contempt proceedings conclude, the Chamber
considered the need for a deterrent from
future disclosures. Seselj’s sentence of
eighteen months includes these punitive
considerations.
The ICTY takes considerable steps to
protect witness’ physical safety through the
Victims and Witnesses Section, providing
security and stiff penalties for disclosure of
protected information. However, such protective measures do not prevent an accused
individual from disclosing information as
Seselj did. Noting this dilemma and the
inherent difficulty of testifying at a war
crimes trial, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe drafted a report on

Judgment Summaries: International
Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
The Prosecutor v. Bizimungu,
et al., Trial Judgment, Case No.
ICTR-99-50-T
On September 30, 2011, Trial Chamber
II of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in
the case against Casimir Bizimungu, Justin
Mugenzi, Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka,
and Prosper Mugiraneza, commonly
referred to as the “Government II” case.
Each of the four accused held positions in
the government of Juvenal Habyarimana
and, following his death, in the interim
government that ruled Rwanda between
April and July 1994. During the events
of the 1994 genocide, Bizimungu served
as Minister of Health, Mugenzi served
as Minister of Commerce, Bicamumpaka
served as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Mugiraneza served as Minister of
Civil Service. Each was charged with nine
counts, namely: genocide; conspiracy to
commit genocide; complicity in genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; murder as a crime against
humanity; extermination as a crime against
humanity; rape as a crime against humanity; the war crime of violence to life,
health and physical or mental well-being
of persons; and outrages upon personal
dignity as a war crime. The Chamber
found Mugenzi and Mugiraneza guilty of
conspiring to commit genocide and direct

witness protection in the Balkans in June
2010. The report highlighted the plight of
witnesses in the former Yugoslavia who
have been murdered, threatened, and had
their identities revealed by parties intent
on obstructing justice. Many witnesses are
reluctant to testify, believing they will be
marked as traitors for doing so. In light
of this, the Assembly decried the ICTY’s
current practice of disclosing the identity
of anonymous witnesses to the defense
prior to the trial. In cases where revealing
the identity of a witness is disproportionate to the risk of harm to that person, the
Assembly encouraged the ICTY to consider amending the Rules to allow witness
anonymity to the defense. On method used
by the European Court of Human Rights is
to secure a “special advocate,” functioning
independently of the parties, to analyze

the evidence, and act as an intermediary
between the witness and the defense.

and public incitement to commit genocide,
but acquitted the two men of all other
charges. Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were
both sentenced to thirty years in prison.
The Chamber acquitted Bizimungu and
Bicamumpaka of all nine of the charges
based on a lack of sufficient evidence, and
ordered their immediate release.

previous rulings based, inter alia, on a new
fact or change in circumstance, but it held
that the fact that an additional year had
passed between its rulings on the initial
Bizimungu and Mugenzi challenges relating to undue pre-trial delay and the actual
commencement of trial did not constitute
a new fact or change in circumstance warranting reconsideration. Thus, the only
claim relating to undue delay considered
by the Trial Chamber in its judgment was
a claim brought by the Mugenzi Defense
alleging that his right to a speedy trial was
violated by the length of the trial itself. The
trial commenced on November 6, 2003 and
concluded on December 5, 2008, with the
Chamber sitting in session for 399 days.
Mugenzi argued that the length of proceedings was a result of “the Tribunal’s failure
to prioritise this case, as well as numerous adjournments and scheduling failures
that delayed the proceedings.” However,
while the Chamber recognized that the
proceedings had been lengthy and that
there were “concerns that the conduct of
the Tribunal, and the increased workload
of the presiding judges more specifically,
has contributed to this delay,” a majority
of the Chamber rejected Mugenzi’s claim,
finding that the length of the proceedings could primarily be attributed to size
and complexity of the case. Judge Emile
Francis Short dissented from this finding,
holding that the fact that the judgment was
not delivered until more than three years
after the close of evidence in the case was
sufficient to constitute a violation of the

Before turning to the allegations
against the four accused, the Trial Chamber
began its judgment by addressing a number of preliminary challenges raised by
the Defense. Among these challenges
were claims submitted by Bicamumpaka,
Bizimungu, and Mugenzi that their right
to be tried without undue delay had been
violated. The trial was among the longest
at the ICTR, with more than twelve years
passing between the arrest of the four suspects and the delivery of the verdict. With
respect to Bicamumpaka’s challenge, the
Chamber held that it had already dealt with
the issue in dismissing a similar motion
brought by the Bicamumpaka Defense
seeking a stay of proceedings based on a
claim that the accused’s right to a speedy
trial had been violated. Similarly, the
Chamber held that it would not reconsider
the claims of Bizimungu and Mugenzi that
their right to trial without undue delay had
been violated by the amount of time that
passed between the arrest of the accused
and the start of trial, as the Chamber had
dismissed motions raising a similar claim
brought by each of these accused prior to
the commencement of trial. Interestingly,
the Chamber noted that it may reconsider
51

Whatever measures of additional witness protection the ICTY takes to address
such situations in the future, it faces the
daunting task of balancing such a measure
against the Article 21(4)(e) rights of the
accused “to examine, or have examined,
the witnesses against him.” In Seselj’s
case, the law binding those present in
court from disclosing information did not
stop him. Given the global audience for
Internet disclosures, Seselj’s actions likely
present an area of concern to the tribunal.
It remains to be seen whether the ICTY
can or will institute a process for allowing
anonymous witnesses to testify without
infringing on the rights of the accused.
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accused’s right to trial without undue delay.
Judge Short would have taken five years
off the sentences given to Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza in compensation for the violation of their rights and held further hearings to determine the appropriate remedy
for Bizimungu and Bicamumpaka.
Turning to the allegations against the
accused, the Prosecution argued that each
of the accused was responsible under both
Article 6(1) (direct responsibility) and
Article 6(3) (superior responsibility) of
the ICTR Statute based on specific events
that allegedly supported the charges. In
addition, the Prosecutor argued in its closing submissions that each of the four
accused bore superior responsibility “for
the genocide as a whole,” claiming that
that the government ministers were “criminally liable for the acts perpetrated by
a range of subordinates, including: the
staff of their respective ministries, the
[Forces Armées Rwandaises], the gendarmerie, soldiers, prefects, prefects’ subordinates, bourgmestres, communal police,
conseillers, local authorities, civic leaders,
militias, Interahamwe, ‘the killers’, civilians and ‘the Hutu population throughout Rwanda.’” Notably, the Tribunal has
previously held that “general statements
of the situation in Rwanda in April 1994
may be illustrative as to the background
of the case, but they are not suited to
prove the individual guilt of the Accused.”
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor asked the
Chamber to “break new ground” by finding that an accused’s “charismatic power
over [a] population based on the history and sociological make-up of that
community” can satisfy the requirement
of a superior-subordinate relationship.
Specifically, in this case, the Prosecutor
argued that the Chamber should consider
“the manner in which [the Accused] were
perceived by society as Ministers, and the
power of influence they commanded” in
determining whether they had a superior
relationship over the various groups of persons responsible for carrying out genocidal
acts throughout the country. However, the
Trial Chamber rejected this allegation,
noting that the Prosecution did not “link
its theory to any specific, proven events
in this case,” but rather presented “vague
arguments” and evidence that was “general
in nature,” which the Chamber determined
to be “wholly insufficient to establish the
rigorous requirements necessary to impose

criminal responsibility pursuant to Article
6 (3) of the Statute.”
In terms of the charges upon which
Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were convicted,
both related to the role of the two accused
in the removal of the Tutsi prefect of Butare
prefecture, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana,
on April 17, 1994, and his replacement
two days later. First, the Chamber determined that, at least as early as April
17, a joint criminal enterprise existed
among several members of the Rwandan
interim government, including Mugenzi,
Mugiraneza, and Rwandan President
Théodore Sindikubwabo, the aim of which
was to kill Tutsis in Butare. In furtherance
of this plan, the members of the enterprise
agreed to remove Habyarimana from his
post “in order to undermine the real and
symbolic resistance that he posed to the
killing of Tutsis in Butare.” According
to the Chamber, the decision to remove
Habyarimana amounted to an agreement
to undertake a preparatory act that, while
preceding the physical perpetration of
genocide, was “clearly aimed at” furthering genocide. Furthermore, the Chamber
determined that both Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza “possessed genocidal intent
when agreeing to remove Habyarimana.”
Thus, the Chamber held, Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza were guilty of conspiracy to
commit genocide. Second, the Chamber
determined that, two days after the
removal of Habyarimana, President
Sindikubwabo delivered an inflammatory speech at the ceremony inaugurating
Habyarimana’s replacement that amounted
to direct and public incitement to genocide. Specifically, the Chamber determined that Sindikubwabo’s speech “was
a direct call for those in Butare to engage
in the killing of Tutsi civilians,” delivered
to a public audience, and that he made
his remarks with genocidal intent. The
Chamber then concluded that the speech
was made “in furtherance of the criminal
purpose” of the joint criminal enterprise
to kill Tutsis in Butare. The Chamber
found that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza
shared President Sindikubwabo’s genocidal intent, as demonstrated by their
involvement in the decision to remove
Habyarimana and their presence at the
inaugural ceremony on April 19. Finally,
the Chamber concluded that Mugenzi
and Mugiraneza “substantially and significantly contributed” to Sindikubwabo’s
incitement by “creat[ing] a scenario that
52

would allow for Sindikubwabo to publicly
and ceremoniously air his inflammatory
speech,” fostering a “context that would
ensure that Sindikubwabo’s inciting message would be understood,” and providing
“significant and substantial moral encouragement to Sindikubwabo as he incited the
killing of Tutsis.” Therefore, the Chamber
concluded that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza
were guilty of direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on their
participation in a joint criminal enterprise.
Based on these convictions, and taking
into account the gravity of the crimes and
aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the Trial Chamber sentenced Mugenzi and
Mugiraneza to thirty years in prison.
Sofia Vivero, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Yussuf Munyakazi v. The
Prosecutor, Appeals Judgment,
Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A
On September 28, 2011, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued
its judgment in the case against Yussuf
Munyakazi. The Trial Chamber convicted
Munyakazi for committing genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity based on his participation in attacks
on the parishes of Shangi and Mibilizi in
April 1994, which resulted in the deaths
of more than 5,000 Tutsi civilians. He was
sentenced to a single term of twenty-five
years of imprisonment. In its opinion,
the Appeals Chamber dismissed each of
Munyakazi’s eight grounds of appeal, as
well as the Prosecutor’s three grounds of
appeal, and confirmed the Trial Chamber’s
judgment and sentence.
As a general matter, questions pertaining to the assessment of evidence played
a significant part in the Chamber’s judgment. When addressing alleged errors in
the assessment of evidence, the Appeals
Chamber stressed that the Trial Chamber is
endowed with broad discretion to evaluate
inconsistencies arising within or among
witnesses’ testimonies and to consider
whether the evidence is credible taken as
a whole. Furthermore, when evaluating
inconsistent accounts, the Trial Chamber

Grandison et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
retains discretion to express a preference
for, and rely on, what it determines to
be the most credible testimony, or piece
of testimony. The Appeals Chamber also
recalled that, consistent with its prior jurisprudence, the Trial Chamber may find that
one witness’s testimony has been satisfactorily corroborated by the testimony of a
second witness, even where some discrepancies exist between the two testimonies.
Thus, for instance, the Appeals Chamber
found no error in the Trial Chamber’s decision to discount minor variances between
the testimony of two witnesses, such as the
gender of certain militia members, noting
that such discrepancies are not unexpected
in the given context, particularly due to the
witnesses’ varying vantage points. The fact
that the testimonies were consistent on key
details, such as the date and timeframe of
the attack, Munyakazi’s participation, and
the general tenor of the events, was deemed
sufficient to support the Chamber’s finding
that the witnesses were credible.
Among Munyakazi’s unsuccessful
grounds of appeal was a claim that the Trial
Chamber erred in its assessment of his
alibi. Specifically, Munyakazi argued that:
(i) the Chamber inappropriately considered
the fact that Munyakazi did not provide
notice of his intent to rely on an alibi in
assessing the reliability of the alibi; and
(ii) the Chamber improperly reversed the
burden of proof by faulting the Defense for
adducing no evidence to support the alibi
other than the testimony of the accused,
which the Chamber found to be unreliable. As to the first issue, the Appeals
Chamber first recalled that Rule 67(A)(ii)
(a) of the ICTR’s Rules of Evidence and
Procedure requires the Defense to notify
the Prosecution before the commencement
of trial of its intent to enter a defense of
alibi. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber
recalled its earlier jurisprudence in which
it held that the Trial Chamber may consider the circumstances in which an alibi
was presented in weighing its credibility.
Thus, the Appeals Chamber found no
error in the Trial Chamber’s holding that,
while the Defense’s failure to provide
advance notice of its alibi was not “dispositive,” the lack of notice, and indeed
the fact that the alibi was not presented
until Munyakazi took the stand as the final
witness for the Defense, affected the credibility of the alibi. On the second issue, the
Appeals Chamber began by reiterating that
the accused does not bear the burden of

proving an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt;
rather, when the defense of alibi is raised,
the Prosecution must establish the allegations against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt despite the alibi. Nevertheless,
the Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial
Chamber has the right to require corroboration of any evidence, and held that, in
this case, “ it was not unreasonable for the
Trial Chamber to question the credibility
of Munyakazi’s alibi in the absence of corroboration given the inherent self-interest
of his testimony and the introduction of the
alibi at the close of the case.”
The Defense also challenged the
validity of the Trial Chamber’s finding
that Munyakazi was responsible for the
attacks at the Shangi and Mibilzi parishes based on his role as a “leader of the
attacks who exercised de facto authority over the Bugarama Interahamwe” that
physically carried out the attacks. In particular, Munyakazi challenged the Trial
Chamber’s finding that he had sufficient
notice that the Prosecution was alleging he
held a leadership role during the attacks.
In reviewing the indictment, the Appeals
Chamber noted that paragraph 1 alleged
that, during the entire period covered by
the indictment, Munyakazi was “a leader
with de facto authority over the Bugarama
MRND Interahamwe militia,” and that
paragraphs 13 and 14 Munyakazi, “with
the Bugarama Interahamwe, attacked and
killed” Tutsi civilians at the two parishes.
However, there was no specific allegation
supporting the Trial Chamber’s ultimate
finding that Munyakazi committed the
crimes at Shangi and Mibilizi parishes
“[o]n the basis of his leadership position at the crime sites.” Nevertheless, the
Appeals Chamber determined that the
“more general allegations” in paragraphs
13 and 14 must be read “in light of paragraph 1,” which alleges Munyakazi’s role
as the leader over the Interahamwe, and
that therefore, the indictment provided
the accused with sufficient notice that he
could be held responsible for the attacks
on the parishes based on his leadership role
over the militia members that carried out
the attacks. Munyakazi also challenged the
Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence
presented in support of the Prosecution’s
claim that Munyakazi acted as a leader
over those who carried out the attacks on
the Shangi and Mibilizi parishes, but the
Appeals Chamber dismissed this challenge,
relying on the principles described above
53

relating to the Trial Chamber’s discretion in
assessing evidence.
Yet another challenge brought by
Munyakazi was that the Trial Chamber
erred in finding that he acted with the
requisite intent to convict him of genocide and the crime against humanity of
extermination. According to Munyakazi,
the Chamber had no legal or factual basis
for its findings of intent, and the Chamber
erred by failing to find that Munyakazi
had formed the intent to commit genocide
prior to the occurrence of the attacks. In its
judgment, the Trial Chamber recognized
that it “had very little direct evidence of
Munyakazi’s intent” with regard to the
acts carried out at the parishes and “no
evidence of his personal views regarding
Tutsis.” However, citing to Munyakazi’s
statement to the Tutsi refugees at Mibilizi
parish that they “were going to pay” for
killing the head of state, and stressing the
“nature and scope of the crimes” committed at both parishes, the Trial Chamber
inferred that Munyakazi acted with the
requisite genocidal intent and with knowledge that the attacks formed part of a
widespread and systematic attack on Tutsi
civilians. The Appeals Chamber found no
error in the Trial Chamber’s approach,
noting that an accused’s genocidal intent
“may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including his active participation
in an attack.” In fact, despite Munyakazi’s
argument to the contrary, the Appeals
Chamber reiterated earlier jurisprudence
holding that “[t]he inquiry is not whether
the specific intent was formed prior to the
commission of the acts, but whether at the
moment of commission the perpetrators
possessed the necessary intent.”
Lastly, the Appeals Chamber dismissed
Munyakazi’s challenge to his sentence,
upholding the Trial Chamber’s finding that
the abuse of a position of influence and
authority in a given case may be counted
as an aggravating factor in sentencing
and deferring to the Trial Chamber’s
broad discretion to dismiss or to take into
account mitigating circumstances raised
by the Defense. Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber held that the fact that Trial
Chamber did not expressly discuss some
mitigating circumstances raised by the
Defense, namely that Munyakazi provided
assistance to several Tutsi friends during
the genocide, is not relevant because a
Trial Chamber is not required to expressly
address every piece of presented evidence,
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and moreover possesses broad discretion
to determine the weight of such evidence.
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the
Prosecution’s request that the sentence be
increased to life imprisonment, and thus
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s sentence of
twenty-five years imprisonment.
Interestingly, Judge Liu attached a
separate opinion to the judgment in which
he discusses the Trial Chamber’s holding
that Munyakazi’s role in the attacks on
the two parishes amounted to “commission” of the charged crimes under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, a holding that
was not challenged on appeal. As Judge
Liu recognized, the ICTR first adopted an
expanded interpretation of “commission”
as a mode of liability in the Gacumbitsi
case, in which the Appeals Chamber held
that, in the context of genocide, a person
need not physically perpetrate the actus
reus or participate in a joint criminal
enterprise aimed at carrying out genocide
to be held responsible for “committing”
genocide, but rather may be found to
have “committed” the crime by performing
other acts, such as directing or supervising killings. This expanded understanding
of “committing” was later applied to the
crime against humanity of extermination.
While Judge Liu acknowledged that this
interpretation could now be considered
settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal, he
nevertheless wrote to express concern that,
by subsuming and conflating the various
modes of individual criminal responsibility outlined in Article 6(1) of the Statute —
namely, committing, planning, ordering,
instigating, and otherwise aiding and abetting — the expanded definition “creates
considerable ambiguity as to the scope of
a convicted person’s criminal responsibility,” which in turn may “run contrary to
basic principles of fairness.” Judge Liu
also noted that the broad interpretation of
“committing” “uncannily resembles joint
criminal enterprise, without requiring the
satisfaction of [the latter’s] more stringent
pleading criteria.”
Andra Nicolescu, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Ephrem Setako v. The Prosecutor,
Appeals Judgment, Case No.
ICTR-04-81-A
On September 28, 2011 the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
judgment in the case against Ephrem
Setako, who served as head of the legal
affairs division of the Rwandan Ministry
of Defence during the 1994 genocide.
At trial, all of the charges against Setako
related to his alleged role in ordering
the killing of Tutsis at the Mukamira
military camp on two separate occasions,
namely on April 25, 1994 and on May 11,
1994. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR had
sentenced Setako to twenty-five years of
imprisonment upon convictions for genocide in relation to both sets of killings;
extermination as a crime against humanity
in relation to the April 25 killings; and
violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons (murder) as
a serious violation of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II in relation to the April 25 killings. On appeal, the Appeals Chamber
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s judgment,
and convicted Setako of an additional
count of murder in violation of Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions based on the
May 11 killings. Despite the additional
conviction, however, the Chamber did
not increase the original twenty-five year
sentence imposed on Setako.
Setako raised several unsuccessful
grounds of appeal, including a claim that
he had been denied a right to a fair
trial. Specifically, Setako challenged the
fact that the Trial Chamber granted the
Prosecutor leave to amend the indictment
more than three years after the initial
indictment had been issued, claiming that
the amended indictment significantly
expanded the case against the accused
and thus deprived him of his rights to be
tried without undue delay and to have
adequate time and facilities to prepare his
defense. In response, the Appeals Chamber
began by recalling that the Trial Chamber
enjoys considerable discretion in determining the conduct of trial proceedings, which
includes determining whether to grant the
Prosecutor leave to amend an indictment.
While the Trial Chamber must safeguard
the accused’s right to a fair and expeditious trial, a discretionary decision of the
Chamber will not be overturned on appeal
unless the challenging party demonstrates
54

a discernible error resulting in prejudice to
that party. Here, the Appeals Chamber held
that Setako failed to make such a demonstration, particularly in light of the fact
that the Trial Chamber did not grant the
Prosecution’s request for leave to amend
the indictment in its entirety. Indeed, the
Trial Chamber rejected several proposed
amendments on the ground that they would
give the Prosecution an “unfair tactical
advantage” given the late stage of the proceedings. Instead, the Trial Chamber only
permitted those amendments that would
enhance the fairness of the trial, such as
those aimed at “better articulating [the
Prosecution’s] theories of criminal responsibility, removing any factual allegations it
no longer wishes to pursue, and correcting
or supplementing with additional detail
any of the existing factual allegations.”
Another of Setako’s unsuccessful
grounds of appeal was a claim that the
Trail Chamber erred in finding two of the
Prosecution’s witnesses, who were “insider
witnesses,” credible. Setako raised a number of challenges to the credibility of the
witnesses, including the fact that, prior to
being investigated by ICTR authorities,
the witnesses had both provided confessions to Rwandan national authorities in
which they made no mention of the crimes
in which they later implicated Setako.
Setako argued that the Trial Chamber failed
to adequately explain these omissions, citing to Rwandan Organic Law 8/96, which
requires that a person making a confession
to Rwandan judicial authorities provide
information about all of the suspect’s crimes
and co-perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber
began its assessment of Setako’s claim by
noting that the credibility of a witness will
depend on a variety of factors and must
be evaluated in the context of all of the
evidence on the record. In the present case,
the Appeals Chamber determined that the
Trial Chamber “reasonably considered” all
of the relevant factors, including the fact
that neither of the two witnesses had been
charged by Rwandan authorities with the
particular crimes in which they later implicated Setako, making it unlikely that they
would voluntarily inform those authorities
that they had in fact participated in the
crimes. With regard to Rwandan Organic
Law 8/96, the Appeals Chamber noted that
Setako had not raised this law before the
Trial Chamber, but rather cited to it for the
first time on appeal, and thus the Defense
could not fault the Trial Chamber for
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failing to address the law in its assessment
of the witnesses’ credibility.
One ground of appeal raised by Setako
that was successful involved a challenge to
the Trial Chamber’s decision to take judicial notice of a certain fact determined by
the Trial Chamber in the Bagosora, et al.
trial, a case that was on appeal at the time
of the Setako Trial Chamber’s judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTR’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a Trial
Chamber may “decide to take judicial
notice of adjudicated facts or documentary
evidence from other proceedings of the
Tribunal relating to the matter at issue in
the current proceedings.” However, Rule
94(B) expressly requires that the Trial
Chamber take judicial notice of a fact or
evidence from other proceedings only “after
hearing the parties.” Furthermore, as established in prior jurisprudence of the ICTR,
the reference to “adjudicated” facts in Rule
94(B) means that the relevant fact must have
been determined in a final judgment. Here,
the Appeals Chamber determined that the
Trial Chamber erred by judicially noticing a
fact from the Bagosora, et al. Trial Chamber
judgment without hearing from the parties
and while the judgment was pending appeal.
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber determined that the fact that was judicially noticed
was otherwise supported by documentary
evidence entered into the record during
Setako’s trial, and thus did not invalidate the
conclusions of the Trial Chamber.
Among the grounds of appeal raised
by the Prosecutor was a challenge to the
Trial Chamber’s failure to convict Setako
of the war crime of murder in relation
to a number of killings that occurred on
May 11, 1994 at the Mukamira military
camp. Notably, the Trial Chamber had
determined that Setako was responsible
for these killings in support of its finding that Setako was guilty of genocide,
but the Chamber made no finding with
respect to the Prosecution’s allegation that
these killings also amounted to murder as

No Refuge: the Quandary of
Resettling Suspects Acquitted
by the ICTR
The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered judgment in
the high profile “Government II” case on
September 30, 2011, and with it brought
a persistently pressing matter back to
the fore: what should the international

a war crime. After reiterating its earlier
dismissal of Setako’s challenge to the Trial
Chamber’s finding that he ordered the
May 11 killings, and determining that the
victims of the killings could not be considered to have been taking an active part in
hostilities at the time of their murder, the
Appeals Chamber, by majority, held that
Setako was in fact guilty of murder as a
war crime based on the incident. While
Judge Pocar agreed with the majority that
the Trial Chamber erred by failing to convict Setako of the charge, he nevertheless
dissented from the majority’s holding on
the ground that he does not believe that
the Appeals Chamber has the authority to
enter a new conviction on appeal. As he
has argued in dissenting opinions issued in
previous cases, Judge Pocar stressed that
Article 24(2) of the ICTR Statute requires
that the Chamber apply fundamental principles of international human rights law,
including those found in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
1966 (ICCPR). Because Article 14(5) of
the ICCPR states that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his
conviction and sentence being reviewed by
a higher tribunal according to law,” Judge
Pocar argued that an accused must have a
right to appeal any conviction entered by
the Tribunal, a right that is denied when the
Appeals Chamber enters a new conviction
on appeal. In Judge Pocar’s opinion, the
Appeals Chamber should have either found
that the Trial Chamber erred in relation to
the charge of murder as a war crime and
remitted the case to the Trial Chamber to
rectify the error, or simply entered its finding regarding the Trial Chamber’s error in
order to correct the record, but decline to
remit the case to the Trial Chamber in light
of efficiency concerns. The latter approach
might be particularly warranted in the
present case, in Judge Pocar’s opinion,
given that the Appeals Chamber determined that the additional conviction did
not affect the accused’s sentence.

The Prosecution also contended on
appeal that the Trial Chamber erred when
it did not address the defendant’s responsibility for the charged crimes under both
Article 6(1) (direct responsibility) and
Article 6(3) (superior responsibility) of the
Statute. Specifically, the Trial Chamber
determined that, because it found that
Setako was guilty under Article 6(1) of the
Statute, it did not need to address Setako’s
liability under Article 6(3), holding that
Setako could not be convicted under both
provisions based on the same set of facts.
While the Appeals Chamber affirmed that
the Trial Chamber could not enter separate
convictions against Setako on the basis
of more than one theory of liability, it
held that the Trial Chamber should have
considered whether Setako bore responsibility under Article 6(3) for purposes of
sentencing. The Appeals Chamber went
on to make the determination itself and
held that the Prosecution had failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Setako exercised effective control over the
individuals who carried out the killings at
the Mukamira military camp, and thus held
that he did not bear superior responsibility
for the charged crimes.

community do with persons acquitted by
the ICTR? In “Government II,” the ICTR
tried four former ministers of the interim
government established in Rwanda after
the assassination of President Juvénal
Habyarimana. Two of the four were acquitted for lack of sufficient proof of involvement. Returning to Rwanda is an unlikely
option for these men because of their high

profiles and the possibility of persecution, and they will have to go through
the difficult process of seeking resettlement in another country. The ICTR has
acquitted ten accused persons, and only
five have managed to find a host country. André Ntagerura has unsuccessfully
sought a host country since his acquittal in
2004. The plight of Ntagerura and others
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Finally, the Appeals Chamber addressed
the appropriateness of the Trial Chamber’s
sentence, holding that although the Appeals
Chamber had entered an additional conviction against Setako for murder as a war
crime, this finding did not warrant an
increase in Setako’s sentence because the
Trial Chamber had “decided on Setako’s
sentence based on a full picture of the
proven material allegations against him.”
Danielle Dean, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9
demonstrates the need for the international
community to put its weight behind the
tribunal’s verdicts and treat the resettlement of persons acquitted by international
tribunals as a contemporaneous duty to the
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals.
Outgoing ICTR President Judge
Khalida Rachid Khan sees the resettlement
of persons acquitted by the tribunal as a
“fundamental expression of the Rule of
Law,” guaranteeing acquitted individuals
the right to live, including full enjoyment
of education, employment, and family.
Judge Khan has repeatedly implored the
UN Security Council to aid in finding a
suitable solution to the problem of resettlement. In a 2008 report highlighting relocation challenges, the ICTR noted that the
effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals will be
seriously challenged if member states do
not demonstrate support in such efforts.
Public response in Rwanda to the acquittal of high profile individuals “convicted” in
the court of public opinion is typically not
positive. Thus, acquitted persons reside in
temporary safe houses in Arusha, Tanzania.
Many UN member states have the ability
to provide a safe alternative, and several
have, but the majority show reluctance to
work with the ICTR. This is due, in part, to
the lack of any formal mechanism for such
relocations. Article 28 of the ICTR Statute
governs cooperation with member states,
but focuses primarily on the identification,
testimony, service, arrest, detention, and
transfer of suspects to the ICTR, and does
not mandate cooperation with requests for
the resettlement of acquitted persons. The
ICTR has thus relied on its registrar to coordinate these relocations, with mixed success
after protracted bilateral negotiations. So far
France has accepted two acquitted persons,
while Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy have
each accepted one.
In the past, the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)
has expressed reservations about granting
refugee status to acquitted persons, pointing to Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention that prohibits refugee status if
“there are serious reasons for considering
that...[one] has committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity….” However, the UNHCR notes
that because acquitted persons fear persecution in Rwanda as a result of their acquittal,
they require refugee status. Furthermore,
an acquittal by an ad hoc tribunal may

effectively remove the “serious reasons for
concern” mentioned in Article 1(F). Yet
refugee or not, the problem of finding a
country to accept the acquitted persons still
remains.
In June 2011, outgoing ICTR President
Khan, with the support of the UNHCR,
appealed to the UN Security Council to
form a solution. The Security Council
responded positively to President Khan’s
request, adopting Resolution 2029 on
December 21, 2011, requesting that member states “cooperate with and render all
necessary assistance to the International
Tribunal in the relocation of acquitted
persons.” Under Article 25 of the Charter
of the United Nations, member states must
“agree to accept and carry out” decisions
of the Security Council, and such decisions
are binding when made under Chapter VII
of the Charter, as was Resolution 2029.
It is now up to the member states and the
ICTR to build a formal mechanism. Five
acquitted persons remain in Arusha under
the protection of the ICTR, and unless
a solution appears soon, the Residual
Mechanism will inherit the challenge of
finding host countries when it takes over
for the ICTR in July 2012.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers the Ad Hoc
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.

Internationalized Tribunals
Prisoners of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone Allege Mistreatment
in Rwanda Prison
Despite complaints of mistreatment from
the prisoners themselves, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) recently found that
the eight men currently serving sentences
in Rwanda for crimes against humanity are
being treated fairly and according to international standards. The SCSL was established in July 2002 to adjudicate war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed
during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The
Appeal Chamber sentenced Allieu Kondewa
and Moinina Fofana in 2008 and RUF
leaders Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon,
and Augustine Gbao in 2009, to prison
sentences in Rwanda. Following customary international standards and complaint
review, Rule 39 of the Rules of Detention
for the SCSL entitles detainees to medical
services, adequate food, family visits, and
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the right to complain about conditions to the
Chief of Detention and the Registrar of the
SCSL. Although the prisoners have alleged
that they did not receive proper nutrition
or medical attention, a committee from the
SCSL did not find sufficient evidence to
warrant transfer to another country.
The SCSL does not have the capacity to house detainees after they have
been convicted, and has therefore made
agreements with Finland, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and Rwanda for prisoners to serve their sentences in those
countries. Having been convicted by the
SCSL, the prisoners are subject to the
SCSL Rules of Detention while they serve
their sentences in the host country. The
Amended Agreement between the SCSL
and the Government of Rwanda states
that the “conditions of imprisonment shall
be consistent with the widely accepted
international standards governing treatment of prisoners,” and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
will inspect the conditions of detention
to ensure that standards are being met.
International standards require that the
dignity of personhood of all detainees be
respected and that all basic needs, such as
health, security and privacy are met in a
reasonable fashion. These needs are judged
in part by medical officers who advice the
Chief of Detention.
Under the Practice Direction for
Designation of State for Enforcement of
Sentence, once the SCSL has finalized a
sentence, the President of the Court decides
where the convict is sent. Rwanda’s commitment to take convicted persons from the
SCSL became part of Rwandan law, which
requires that the detention centers maintain
a standard comparable to the requirements
of the SCSL. However, prison conditions
throughout Rwanda have historically been
criticized, due to concerns of overcrowding,
poor medical care, and physical. Because
Rwandan law requires less stringent prison
conditions, there is concern that the prisoners of the SCSL in Rwanda are being
denied their rights to adequate standards
of detention under the SCSL Rules of
Detention and customary international
law. However, the Commissioner General
of Rwandan Correctional Services stated
that the SCSL prisoners are given special
treatment in Rwandan prisons and after
a committee from the SCSL visited the
prison in Rwanda and reported back to the
court, the SCSL stated that the prisoners
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were being treated in accordance with
international standards.
Based on the report issued by the SCSL
in January 2012, it seems unlikely that
the prisoners will be removed to another
country. Given the difference in prison
conditions between Rwanda and prisons in
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
it is understandable that the prisoners
would want to be transferred to one of
the European countries known for better
health care and more humane prison conditions. Furthermore, the prisoners’ wives
could seek asylum in the European host
country under European asylum laws to
be near their husbands. While the SCSL
prisoners’ complaints may put a spotlight
on the Rwandan prison system, allegations
of overcrowding and human rights abuses
have long plagued the Rwandan prison
system. However, with the SCSL report
stating no findings of abuse, it is unlikely
that the prisoners will be moved to Europe.
Prisoners’ rights are an important
aspect of international justice because the
humane treatment of detainees and convicts legitimizes an international court’s
ability to adjudicate human rights abuses.
However, determining what constitutes
fair treatment is challenging when prison
conditions among different countries vary
widely. As the SCSL has agreements with
both European and African nations to host
prisoners, prisoners understandably prefer
sentences in European countries with better prison facilities. However, there is a
limited amount the SCSL can do without
clear evidence of prisoner abuse and violations of international standards.

Trials In Absentia in the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon
For the first time since the Nuremburg
trial in abstentia of Martin Bormann in
1946, an internationalized court, namely
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),
has initiated a trial completely in abstentia. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Salim
Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad
Hassan Sabra, the pre-trial court seized the
trial chamber and determined that a trial in

abstentia is appropriate at this time. The
defendants were indicted in June 2011,
but as of February 2012, none of the four
accused of assassinating former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had appeared
before the court. Because trials in absentia
are a controversial concept, as the STL
begins its proceedings, it will have to balance the need for efficient justice with the
rights of the accused for a fair trial under
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(3)(d).
Trials in absentia are controversial
because they seem to violate the due process rights guaranteed in Article 14(3)(d)
of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which ensures the right of
a defendant “to be tried in his presence.”
Despite this discord with the ICCPR,
many countries, such as the United States,
France and Italy, allow for partial trials in
abstentia if the accused is aware of and
present for the initial hearing of the trial.
The validity of a trial in abstentia rests on
the guarantee that the defendant has the
same rights during the trial as if he were
present, and that he is made aware of the
initial proceedings and indictment. The
European Court of Human Rights allows
trials in absentia provided that a retrial is
permitted if the defendant chooses, except
if the defendant waived his right to be present and had his chosen counsel appear on
his behalf.
Unlike in the United States, the STL
can hold trials completely in absentia
under Article 22 of the Statute of the STL
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
105 and 106. A trial in abstentia shall be
conducted in the STL if the defendant has
waived his right to be present, has not been
handed over to the STL, or has absconded
and the court has taken all “reasonable
precautions” such as coordinating with
Lebanese authorities. Rule 105 bis (A)
allows the pre-trial court to initiate a trial
in abstentia if the defendants have not
communicated with the court thirty days
after the indictment.
The STL issued the indictment in
Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, et al.
on June 28, 2011. Despite arrest warrants
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being issued on July 8, 2011, the defendants failed to appear before the court.
In September, the pre-trial court initiated proceedings to seize the trial court
to determine if a trial in absentia could
proceed. However, the prosecution filed a
motion that was granted requesting a delay
in the proceedings because all reasonable
measures to secure the defendants under
Rule 106 have not been completed. The
prosecution cited a lack of cooperation
between the trial court and the Lebanese
authorities who could do more to search
for and arrest the defendants. However,
on February 1, 2012, the Trial Chamber
ordered the commencement of a trial in
absentia against the four accused to start
this year. If the four accused are found
guilty, they may accept the verdict of the
trial in absentia, accept the verdict and
request a hearing on some aspect of the
case, or request a new trial.
While in theory an apolitical tribunal,
the STL is in a tenuous position given
the current political situation in Lebanon.
As the three-year mandate of the tribunal
draws to a close and Hezbollah gains
political support throughout the country,
in part by promising to defund the STL,
issuing a ruling to authorize a trial in
absentia may add fuel to the fire and create increased resentment against the tribunal. Furthermore, the validity of a trial
in absentia must be questioned. While the
indictments of the four accused have been
published throughout Lebanon and the
world, it is possible that the suspects are so
well hidden that they have not heard of the
indictments, in which case commencing
with a trial against them could violate their
rights under the ICCPR. On the other hand,
if the TIMES article is true, the rights
of the victims to have their day in court
against the accused should not be denied
simply because the controlling political
party in Lebanon wishes to avoid it. In the
end, effective international justice should
rise above the political concerns of a state.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Internationalized
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.

